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1 Introduction
General equilibrium models play one of the main roles in Economics. They in partic-
ular indicate ways of equilibrating different interests and opportunities of the active
elements (agents, participants) involved in economic systems and may serve as a basis
for description of behavior of these very complex systems.
Investigation of the general equilibrium models dates back to the book by L. Walras
[1]. Since then, a number of different kinds of these models were proposed; see [2, 3,
4, 5, 6]. More detailed surveys and expositions of the basic contributions in this field
can be found in [7, 8]. These models usually describe markets of a great number
of economic agents (customers and producers) so that actions of any separate agent
can not impact the state of the whole system, hence any agent utilizes some integral
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system parameters (say, prices), rather than the information about the behavior of
other separate agents. The traditional approach is based on the assumption that the
agents are able to determine precisely their desirable collections of commodities for any
vector of common market prices. Then an equilibrium market state is defined from the
complementarity conditions between the price and excess supply of each commodity
since the usual material balance condition needs additional restrictive assumptions. At
the same time, it holds for each commodity with positive equilibrium price; see e.g.
[7, 8].
In this paper, we suggest some other approach to creation of general equilibrium
models, where the current market state is supposed to be completely defined by the vec-
tor of the full transaction quantities of the agents. These quantities must clearly satisfy
the balance equation. It should be noted that simple market equilibrium models with
infinitely divisible goods and price functions, which were supposed to be implemented
within auction mechanisms, were first proposed in [9, 10]. Their further development
and applications are described in [11, 12, 13, 14].
In our general model we suppose that the agents can strike only preliminary (or
virtual) bargains and change market states, but fix them only after attaining an equi-
librium state. At each state the agents determine their particular feasible volume
transaction and price sets that describe their behavior with respect to market states.
We thus suppose that behavior of the agents may depend on their current market,
industry and social goals and restrictions, hence they must in principle utilize different
collections of particular prices for the transactions. The market equilibrium condition
is formulated as a quasi-variational inequality and corresponds to the local maximal
market profit state concept. This approach enables one to utilize well developed tools
from the theory of quasi-variational inequalities for establishing existence results and
for describing natural dynamic processes based on suitable iterative solution methods.
We outline now briefly the further organization of the paper. In Section 2, we first
describe a single commodity market equilibrium model and its variational inequality re-
formulation. In Section 3, we describe a general multi-commodity market equilibrium
model in the form of a quasi-variational inequality. Its basic properties are given in
Section 4. Implementation issues of this model are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
involves description and substantiation of some dynamic market processes converging
to equilibrium points. In Section 7, we give a comparison of the presented model with
the existing basic general and partial equilibrium models.
2 A single commodity market equilibrium model
For the simplicity of exposition, we begin our considerations from a simple equilibrium
market model of a homogeneous commodity, which was suggested in [9, 10, 11] for
description of a simple market based on a suitable auction implementation mechanism.
The model involves a finite number of traders and buyers of this commodity, their
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index sets will be denoted by I and J , respectively. For each i ∈ I, the i-th trader
chooses some offer value xi in his/her capacity segment [α
′
i, β
′
i] and has a price function
gi. Similarly, for each j ∈ J , the j-th buyer chooses some bid value yj in his/her
capacity segment [α′′j , β
′′
j ] and has a price function hj . The signs of all the lower and
upper bounds are arbitrary in general, but the standard choice is to set α′i = 0 and
α′′j = 0, hence the upper bounds are chosen to be positive. Then we can define the
feasible set of offer/bid volumes
D =
{
(x, y)
∑
i∈I
xi =
∑
j∈J
yj;
xi ∈ [α
′
i, β
′
i], i ∈ I, yj ∈ [α
′′
j , β
′′
j ], j ∈ J
}
, (1)
where x = (xi)i∈I , y = (yj)j∈J . We suppose that the prices may in principle depend on
offer/bid volumes of all the participants, i.e. gi = gi(x, y) and hj = hj(x, y). We say
that a pair (x¯, y¯) ∈ D constitutes a market equilibrium point if there exists a number
λ¯ such that
gi(x¯, y¯)


≥ λ¯ if x¯i = α
′
i,
= λ¯ if x¯i ∈ (α
′
i, β
′
i),
≤ λ¯ if x¯i = β
′
i,
for i ∈ I, (2)
and
hj(x¯, y¯)


≤ λ¯ if y¯j = α
′′
j ,
= λ¯ if y¯j ∈ (α
′′
j , β
′′
j ),
≥ λ¯ if y¯j = β
′′
j ,
for j ∈ J. (3)
Observe that the number λ¯ can be treated as a market clearing price, which equilibrates
the market and yields also the offer/bid volumes for all the participants. In fact, the
minimal offer (bid) volumes correspond to traders (buyers) whose prices are greater
(less) than λ¯, and the maximal offer (bid) volumes correspond to traders (buyers)
whose prices are less (greater) than λ¯. The prices of other participants are equal to
λ¯ and their volumes may be arbitrary within their capacity bounds, but should be
subordinated to the balance equation. It follows that agents’ prices at equilibrium may
in general differ from the market clearing price.
In [9] (see also [10, 11]), the following basic relation between the equilibrium problem
(1)–(3) and a variational inequality (VI, for short) was established.
Proposition 1
(a) If (x¯, y¯, λ¯) satisfies (2)–(3) and (x¯, y¯) ∈ D, then (x¯, y¯) solves VI: Find (x¯, y¯) ∈ D
such that ∑
i∈I
gi(x¯, y¯)(xi − x¯i)−
∑
j∈J
hj(x¯, y¯)(yj − y¯j) ≥ 0 ∀(x, y) ∈ D. (4)
(b) If a pair (x¯, y¯) ∈ D solves VI (4), then there exists λ¯ such that (x¯, y¯, λ¯) satisfies
(2)–(3).
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Therefore, we can apply various results from the theory of VIs (see e.g. [10]) for
investigation and solution of the above equilibrium problem. For instance, if the set D
in (1) is nonempty and bounded, the functions gi and hj are continuous for all i ∈ I
and j ∈ J , then VI (4) has a solution.
3 A general multi-commodity market equilibrium
model
We now present a multi-commodity extension of the model described in Section 2, thus
also extending those in [11, 13].
The model is an n-commodity market involving m economic agents, they are pro-
ducers and consumers with respect to these commodities. We suppose that the agents
can strike preliminary (or virtual) bargains but fix them only after attaining an equi-
librium state. Denote by N = {1, . . . , n} and I = {1, . . . , m} the index sets of com-
modities and agents at this market. Next, let the vector xi = (xi1, . . . , xin)
⊤ define
the current (virtual) volumes of commodities of the i-th agent, so that xij > 0 means
that his/her current sold volume of the j-th commodity equals xij , whereas xij < 0
means that his/her current purchased volume of the j-th commodity equals −xij . The
current market state is thus supposed to be completely defined by the virtual volume
vector x = (xi)i∈I .
At each state x the agents determine first their current feasible volume transaction
sets Yi(x) ⊆ Y˜i for i ∈ I, which are supposed to be nonempty sets in R
n. Hence, the
agents can change their current volumes within these sets. In other words, we define
the set-valued feasible mapping x 7→ Y (x) on the set Y˜ where
Y (x) =
∏
i∈I
Yi(x), Y˜ =
∏
i∈I
Y˜i.
At each state x the agents determine similarly their feasible price sets Pi(x) ⊆ P˜i
for i ∈ I, which are also supposed to be nonempty sets in Rn+. These price sets can
be based mostly on their production technology restrictions and must depend on the
current volumes of commodities. In other words, we define the set-valued feasible price
mapping x 7→ P (x) on the set Y˜ where
P (x) =
∏
i∈I
Pi(x), P (x) ⊆ P˜ =
∏
i∈I
P˜i ∀x ∈ Y˜ .
Both volume and price mappings describe the behavior of the economic agents with
respect to market states. Afterwards, the agents can make some transactions and
change their current volumes that gives a new market state an so on. Nevertheless,
any market transaction must also satisfy the balance equation, hence we obtain the
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set-valued feasible transaction mapping x 7→ D(x) with the values
D(x) =
{
y ∈ Y (x)
∑
i∈I
yi = 0; yi ∈ Yi(x), i ∈ I
}
. (5)
Taking into account Proposition 1 we say that a vector x¯ ∈ D(x¯) is amarket equilibrium
point if
∃p¯ ∈ P (x¯), 〈p¯, y − x¯〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ D(x¯). (6)
Therefore, the general multi-commodity market equilibrium problem is formulated as
a quasi-variational inequality (QVI, for short). It follows that the described process
of changing the market states continues until attaining a solution of problem (6), thus
creating a decentralized (self-regulation) transaction mechanism. The implementation
of this mechanism is clearly attributed to a suitable information exchange scheme of
this model and depends on the properties of the defined sets and mappings. These
issues will be investigated in the next sections.
We now observe that the value
−〈p¯, x¯〉 = −
∑
i∈I
〈p¯i, x¯i〉
gives precisely the difference between the total bought and sold amount at the current
market state x¯ and current price vector p¯ of the agents, i.e., it is the current possible
profit of the market. Therefore, the market equilibrium point x¯ ∈ D(x¯) can be treated
as the state that provides the maximal possible market profit at the current prices
of the agents subject to the constraints determining the balance and current feasible
transactions.
4 Basic properties
First we give analogues of equilibrium conditions (2)–(3) for the above problem. We
will take the following basic assumptions.
(A1) The sets Y˜i ⊂ R
n are convex and compact for all i ∈ I. At each state x the
sets Yi(x) and Pi(x) are nonempty, convex and compact for all i ∈ I.
Let us define the problem of finding a feasible point x¯ ∈ D(x¯) and a vector λ¯ ∈ Rn
such that
∃p¯ ∈ P (x¯), 〈p¯− λ¯, y − x¯〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ Y (x¯). (7)
Proposition 2 Suppose that the assumptions in (A1) are fulfilled. Then:
(a) If a point x¯ ∈ D(x¯) solves QVI (5)–(6), then there exists λ¯ such that (x¯, λ¯)
satisfies (7).
(b) If a pair (x¯, λ¯) ∈ D(x¯)× Rn satisfies (7), then x¯ solves QVI (5)–(6).
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Proof. If x¯ ∈ D(x¯) solves QVI (5)–(6), then it solves the optimization problem
min → {〈p¯, y〉 | y ∈ D(x¯)} . (8)
By using the suitable Karush-Kuhn-Tucker theorem for this problem (see e.g. [15,
Corollary 28.2.2]), we obtain that (7) gives its necessary and sufficient optimality con-
dition. Conversely, let a pair (x¯, λ¯) ∈ D(x¯) × Rn satisfy (7). Using the same Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker theorem we obtain that x¯ solves (8), hence it is a solution to QVI (5)–(6).
✷
We observe that problem (7) can be replaced by the following equivalent system of
partial QVIs:
∃p¯i ∈ Pi(x¯), 〈p¯
i, yi − x¯i〉 ≥ 0 ∀yi ∈ Yi(x¯), ∀i ∈ I. (9)
It is clear that (7) (or (9)) represents an analogue of the equilibrium conditions
in (2)–(3) for the above multi-commodity market equilibrium model, hence the point
λ¯ in (7), which is nothing but the Lagrange multiplier vector corresponding to the
balance constraint, should be treated as the genuine market equilibrium price vector
for this model. We observe that the equilibrium prices of the agents do not in general
coincide with λ¯ due to the presence of the constraints determining the feasible volume
transaction sets Yi(x¯) for all i = 1, . . . , l. This is the case even for the simplest single
commodity equilibrium model due to (2)–(3). It follows that the agents can not main-
tain in general the unique market prices at a given state of the market as in the usual
Walrasian models.
It is well known that QVIs can be also converted into the fixed point format by
using the projection mapping. Let piX(x) denote the projection of a point x onto a set
X .
Proposition 3 (see [16, Theorem 5.1]) Suppose that the assumptions in (A1) are
fulfilled. Then QVI (5)–(6) is equivalent to the fixed point problem
x¯ ∈ piD(x¯)[x¯− θP (x¯)],
for some θ > 0.
This fact enables us to apply the simplest projection method
x(k+1) = piD(x(k))[x
(k) − θkp
(k)], p(k) ∈ P (x(k)), θk > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . , (10)
for finding a solution of QVI (5)–(6). However, its convergence needs additional as-
sumptions. It seems reasonable to give a natural treatment of this method as a dynamic
process for finding market equilibrium points in the above model together with suitable
convergence conditions.
In order to obtain existence results, we need several continuity properties of set-
valued mappings.
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Definition 1 Let W and V be convex sets in Rn, W ⊆ V , and let T : V → Π(Rn) be
a set-valued mapping. The mapping T is said to be
(a) upper semicontinuous (u.s.c.) on W , if for each point v ∈ W and for each open
set U such that U ⊇ T (v), there is an open neighborhood V˜ of v such that T (w) ⊂ U
whenever w ∈ V˜ ∪W ;
(b) lower semicontinuous (l.s.c.) on W , if for each point v ∈ W and for each
open set U such that U
⋂
T (v) 6= ∅, there is an open neighborhood V˜ of v such that
U
⋂
T (w) 6= ∅ whenever w ∈ V˜ ∪W ;
(c) continuous on W , if it is both u.s.c. and l.s.c. on W .
Here and below, Π(X) denotes the power set of X , i.e., the family of all nonempty
subsets of X . We first give the existence result for the market equilibrium problem as
proper specialization of similar properties for general QVIs; see e.g. [6, Theorem 9.14].
(A2) The mapping Y : Y˜ → Π(Rn) is continuous on Y˜ , the mapping P : Y˜ →
Π(Rn) is upper semi-continuous on Y˜ .
Theorem 1 Suppose that assumptions (A1) and (A2) are fulfilled. Then QVI (5)–
(6) has a solution.
Moreover, it seems natural to suppose that the feasible volume transaction set of
each i-th agent Yi(x) will contain the current volume vector x
i. This assumption allows
us to take the existence result for the usual VIs as noticed in [17, Theorem 3].
(A2′) The mapping P : Y˜ → Π(Rn) is upper semi-continuous on Y˜ , x ∈ Y (x) for
all x ∈ Y˜ .
Theorem 2 Suppose that assumptions (A1) and (A2′) are fulfilled. Then QVI (5)–
(6) has a solution.
Proof. Let us take the following VI: Find a point x¯ ∈ Y˜ such that
∃p¯ ∈ P (x¯), 〈p¯, y − x¯〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ Y˜ .
Under the above assumptions it must have a solution; see, e.g., [6, Theorem 9.9]. Due
to (A2′) it also solves QVI (5)–(6). ✷
5 Implementation issues
The multi-commodity equilibrium model presented in Section 3 seems incomplete with-
out a more detailed description of feasible transaction and price sets attributed to each
state x of the market. We observe that the behavior of each i-th economic agent may
depend on his/her current market, industry and social goals and restrictions. We intend
to first select market capacity constraints, which will determine the feasible transaction
set Yi(x) associated with the current market state x. In general, these constraints can
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reflect common market or technology relationships among several commodities that
are actively utilized by different agents. Also, the initial distribution of commodity en-
dowments must have clear impact on the feasible transaction sets. But in the simplest
case Yi(x) is thus a box-constrained set, i.e.
Yi(x) =
{
yi ∈ Rn yij ∈ [αij(x), βij(x)], j = 1, . . . , n
}
.
The feasible transaction sets can be also determined as intersections of obligatory and
desirable transaction sets. For instance, let Y˜i ⊂ R
n denote the set of obligatory market
capacity constraints of the i-th agent, which is independent of market states. Also, let
Wi ⊂ R
nm denote the set of desirable market volume distributions of the i-th agent.
Then the feasible transaction set Yi(x) at the state x is defined as follows:
Yi(x) = Y˜i
⋂
Y ′i (x), where Y
′
i (x) =
{
yi ∈ Rn (x−i, yi) ∈ Wi
}
.
This means that the capacity constraints may depend on the current state x. That
is, each agent may evaluate his/her capacity bounds by using the information about
the current supply or demand of some related commodities as well as their bounds.
Nevertheless, each set Yi(x) is supposed to be convex and closed.
We propose to take into account possible industry and social capacity constraints
during evaluation of the current feasible price sets Pi(x) associated with the current
market state x and take the agent profit as the goal function. In other words, each i-th
agent solves the optimization problem:
max
pi∈Vi(x)
→ 〈pi, xi〉, (11)
where Vi(x) ⊂ R
n
+ and takes its solution set as Pi(x). We note that 〈p
i, xi〉 gives pre-
cisely the profit of the i-th agent within his/her own prices. Therefore, the feasible set
Vi(x) may depend on the current state x. In fact, this can reflect utilization of common
waste treatment plants or environment restrictions for some industry technologies of
different agents, common transportation capacity restrictions, application of nonlinear
production technologies, utilization of special financial tools, etc.
Let us take the simplest case with independent linear production technologies. For
each xi define the index sets I ′i(x
i) and I ′′i (x
i), which determine the current agent’s
supply and demand commodities at state x. It follows that xij ≥ 0 if j ∈ I
′
i(x
i) and
xij ≤ 0 if j ∈ I
′′
i (x
i). Then Vi(x) becomes a polyhedral set, i.e.
Vi(x) =

vi ∈ Sn+
∑
s∈I′′
i
(xi)
aisjvis ≥ vij , j ∈ I
′
i(x
i)

 (12)
where aisj is the amount of the s-th commodity used for production of one unit of the
j-th commodity by the i-th economic agent,
S
n
+ =
{
z ∈ Rn+
n∑
j=1
zj = 1
}
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is the standard simplex in Rn. Hence, the relative price scale is taken here. Then
(11)–(12) is a linear programming problem and
Pi(x) = ∂µi(x), (13)
i.e. the solution set of problem (11)–(12) is the sub-differential of its optimal value
function µi, which is clearly convex. The inequalities in (12) mean that the minimal
price pij of the j-th commodity can not be greater than the expenses for all the factors
(resources) used for production of one unit of this commodity. We observe that the non-
industrial consumption commodities can be taken into account similarly. The agent
should only indicate that consumption expenses per unit of the s-th commodity will be
covered with selling all the commodities such that aisj > 0. The coefficient values a
i
sj
will give the corresponding relative scale, i.e. the relative weights of commodities for
any agent. In such a way this model can in principle describe a pure exchange market.
Similarly, common waste treatment or environment restrictions can be inserted in the
model. In the general case all these parameters may also depend on the current state
x, i.e. the agents can change their preferences for commodities with respect to the
current distribution of volumes.
6 Convergence of dynamic processes
The existence of natural dynamic market processes converging to an equilibrium point
is very essential for justification of any suggested equilibrium concept. But it is well
known that substantiation of such dynamic processes is much more difficult in com-
parison with that of static existence results. In fact, the multi-commodity equilibrium
model from Section 3 is formulated as QVI (5)–(6), whose direct solution via an itera-
tive process seems very difficult in the general case. For this reason, it is more suitable
to present rather broad classes of equilibrium problems of form (5)–(6), which admit
natural converging dynamic processes. First of all we observe that converging dynamic
processes based on bilateral transactions were proposed for the single commodity mar-
ket equilibrium model from Section 2; see [18, 19, 20]. We now give examples of iterative
processes, which have rather natural treatment and are convergent for some classes of
multi-commodity market equilibrium problems.
Let us consider the model of Section 3 in the stationary case where the feasible
transaction sets and offer/bid index sets are independent of market states and the
feasible price mappings are defined from the optimization problems in (11). More
precisely, we now take the following assumptions.
(B1) At each state x ∈ Y˜ it holds that Yi(x) = Y˜i, where
Y˜i =
{
yi ∈ Rn yij ∈ [αij, βij ], j = 1, . . . , n
}
for all i ∈ I, the set
Y˜ =
∏
i∈I
Y˜i;
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is bounded. At each state x ∈ Y˜ it holds that I ′i(x
i) = I ′i and I
′′
i (x
i) = I ′′i for all i ∈ I.
(B2) At each state x ∈ Y˜ the set Pi(x) is determined as the solution set of opti-
mization problem (11)–(12), where the set Vi(x) = Vi is non-empty for all i ∈ I.
(B3) At each state x ∈ Y˜ it holds that D(x) = D˜, where the set
D˜ =
{
y ∈ Y˜
∑
i∈I
yi = 0; yi ∈ Y˜i, i ∈ I
}
(14)
is non-empty; cf. (5).
Then QVI (5)–(6) reduces to the set-valued VI: Find a vector x¯ ∈ D such that
∃p¯ ∈ P (x¯), 〈p¯, y − x¯〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ D˜. (15)
Moreover, due to (13) this problem is equivalent to the convex optimization problem:
min
x∈D˜
→ µ(x) =
∑
i∈I
µi(x
i),
where µi(x
i) = µi(x) is the optimal value of problem (11)–(12). This means that
the set of market equilibrium states coincide with the set of the points with minimal
pure expenses (or maximal profit) of the whole market. It is clear that VI (14)–(15)
has a solution under the assumptions in (B1)–(B3). This result follows e.g. from
Theorem 2. Next, we can find a solution of VI (14)–(15) by using various convex
non-differentiable optimization methods; see e.g. [21, 22]. However, rather few these
methods admit natural treatments within our multi-commodity market equilibrium
model. In particular, the fixed point iterate (10) now reduces to the sub-gradient
projection method:
x(k+1) = piD˜[x
(k) − θkp
(k)], p(k) ∈ P (x(k)), θk > 0, k = 0, 1, . . . , (16)
with the standard step-size rules:
∞∑
k=0
θk =∞,
∞∑
k=0
θ2k <∞. (17)
Its convergence can be deduced e.g. from Lemma 2.1 in [23, Chapter V].
Proposition 4 Suppose that assumptions (B1)–(B3) are fulfilled. If a sequence
{x(k)} is subordinated to rules (16)–(17), it converges to a solution of problem (14)–
(15).
At the k-th iteration, k = 0, 1, . . ., the agents determine their price vector p(k) for
the current market state x(k) in accordance with (B2). Afterwards, they find the next
state x(k+1) from (16). This problem clearly decomposes into n independent single
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commodity market equilibrium problems of form (4) with affine price functions. In
fact, the j-th commodity market problem is written as VI: Find x
(k+1)
(j) ∈ D˜j such that∑
i∈I
(p
(k)
ij + θ
−1
k (x
(k+1)
ij − x
(k)
ij ))(yij − x
(k+1)
ij ) ≥ 0 ∀y(j) ∈ D˜j, (18)
where y(j) = (y1j, . . . , xmj)
⊤ and
D˜j =
{
y(j) ∈ R
m
∑
i∈I
yij = 0, yij ∈ [αij, βij ], i ∈ I
}
. (19)
This problem can be solved by simple solution algorithms including the bilateral ex-
changes; see [18, 19]. Therefore, process (16) can be naturally implemented within
usual market mechanisms.
Let us consider the model of Section 3 in the case where only offer/bid index sets
are independent of market states, but feasible transactions are defined by set-valued
mappings.
(C1) At each state x ∈ Y˜ it holds that
Yi(x) =
{
yi ∈ Y˜i yij ∈ [αij(x), βij(x)], j = 1, . . . , n
}
,
where
Y˜i =
{
yi ∈ Rn yij ∈ [α
′
ij, β
′
ij ], j = 1, . . . , n
}
for all i ∈ I, the set
Y˜ =
∏
i∈I
Y˜i;
is bounded. At each state x ∈ Y˜ it holds that
x ∈ Y (x) =
∏
i∈I
Yi(x).
At each state x it holds that I ′i(x
i) = I ′i and I
′′
i (x
i) = I ′′i for all i ∈ I.
Next, we suppose that each i-th economic agent chooses his/her feasible price set
Pi(x) at state x bearing in mind some most suitable reference price vector v¯
i, i.e.
problem (11)–(12) is replaced by the optimization problem
max
pi∈Vi
→
n∑
j=1
{
pijxij − 0.5βi(pij − v¯ij)
2
}
, (20)
where
Vi =

vi ∈ Sn+
∑
s∈I′′i
aisjvis ≥ vij , j ∈ I
′
i

 (21)
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and βi > 0 is a suitable weight parameter. Since it has the unique solution p
i(xi) =
pi(x), the mapping x 7→ Pi(x) is now single-valued for each i ∈ I and so is x 7→ P (x).
If we denote by ηi(x
i) the optimal value of problem (20)–(21), then the function ηi(x
i)
will be convex and differentiable and η′i(x
i) = pi(xi). In turn, p(x) = (pi(x))i∈I is the
gradient of the convex function
η(x) =
∑
i∈I
ηi(x
i). (22)
In other words, we now take the following assumptions.
(C2) At each state x the point pi(x) = pi(xi) is determined as a unique solution of
optimization problem (20)–(21), where the set Vi is non-empty for all i ∈ I.
(C3) The set D(x) defined in (5) is non-empty at each state x ∈ Y˜ , the mapping
D : Y˜ → Π(Rn) is lower semi-continuous on Y˜ .
Then QVI (5)–(6) reduces to the single-valued problem: Find a vector x¯ ∈ D(x¯)
such that
〈p(x¯), y − x¯〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ D(x¯). (23)
Its solution can be however deduced from the usual VI: Find a vector x¯ ∈ D˜ such that
〈p(x¯), y − x¯〉 ≥ 0 ∀y ∈ D˜, (24)
where the set D˜ is defined in (14). From (C1) and (C3) it follows that D˜ is nonempty,
convex and compact. From (C2) it follows that the mapping p(x) is continuous on
Y˜ . Hence, VI (14) has a solution x¯ ∈ D˜. Due to (C1) we have x¯ ∈ Y (x¯), therefore,
x¯ ∈ D(x¯). This means that x¯ is a solution to QVI (23). We observe that the reverse
implication (23) =⇒ (24) does not hold in general.
Proposition 5 Suppose that assumptions (C1)–(C3) are fulfilled. Then QVI (23)
has a solution.
Moreover, VI (24) is equivalent to the convex smooth optimization problem:
min
x∈D˜
→ η(x),
where η(x) is defined in (22). This means that we can find a solution of QVI (23) by
using well known smooth optimization methods; see e.g. [24]. We take a modification
of the parametric conditional gradient method without line-search from [25]. Given a
point x ∈ D˜ we define the auxiliary problem
min
y∈D(x)
→ 〈p(x), y〉. (25)
We denote by Z(x) the solution set of problem (25), thus defining the set-valued
mapping x 7→ Z(x). Observe that the set Z(x) is always non-empty, convex, and
compact.
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Method (PCGM).
Initialization: Choose a point w(0) ∈ D˜, a number β ∈ (0, 1), and a positive sequence
{δs} → 0. Set s = 1.
Step 0: For the given number s choose a positive sequence {τl,s} such that τl,s ∈
(0, 1) and {τl,s} → 0 as l → ∞. Set k = 0, l = 0, x
(0) = w(s−1), and choose a number
θ0 ∈ (0, τ0,s].
Step 1: Find a point y(k) ∈ Z(xk). If
〈p(x(k)), x(k) − y(k)〉 ≥ δs, (26)
go to Step 2. Otherwise set w(s) = x(k), s = s+ 1 and go to Step 0. (Restart)
Step 2: Set d(k) = y(k) − x(k), x(k+1) = x(k) + θkd
(k). If
〈p(x(k+1)), d(k)〉 ≤ β〈p(x(k)), d(k)〉, (27)
take θk+1 ∈ [θk, τl,s]. Otherwise take θk+1 ∈ (0,min{θk, τl+1}] and set l = l + 1.
Afterwards set k = k + 1 and go to Step 1.
Note that each outer iteration (stage) in s contains some number of inner iterations
in k with the fixed tolerance δs. Completing each stage, that is marked as restart,
leads to decrease of its value. Note that the choice of the parameters {τl,s} can be in
principle independent for each stage s. Also, by (26), we have
〈p(x(k)), d(k)〉 ≤ −δs < 0
in (27). It follows that
η(x(k+1))− η(x(k)) ≤ θk〈p(x
(k+1)), d(k)〉 ≤ βθk〈f
′(x(k)), d(k)〉
≤ −βθkδs, (28)
besides, x(k) ∈ D˜ for each k.
We show that each stage is well defined.
Proposition 6 Suppose that assumptions (C1)–(C3) are fulfilled. Then the number
of iterations at each stage s is finite.
Proof. Fix any s and suppose that the sequence {x(k)} is infinite. Then the number
of changes of index l is also infinite. In fact, otherwise we have θk ≥ θ¯ > 0 for k large
enough, hence (28) gives
η(x(k+t)) ≤ η(x(k))− tβθ¯δs → −∞ as t→∞,
for k large enough, which is a contradiction. Therefore, there exists an infinite subse-
quence of indices {kl} such that
〈p(x(kl+1)), d(kl)〉 > β〈p(x(kl)), d(kl)〉, (29)
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where d(kl) = z(kl) − x(kl). Besides, it holds that
θkl ∈ (0, τl,s], θkl+1 ∈ (0, τl+1,s],
where
lim
l→∞
τl,s = 0.
Both the sequences {x(k)} and {z(k)} belong to the bounded set D˜ and hence have
limit points. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that the subsequence {x(kl)}
converges to a point x¯ and the corresponding subsequence {z(kl)} converges to a point
z¯. Due to (26) we have
〈p(x¯), z¯ − x¯〉 = lim
l→∞
〈p(x(kl)), z(kl) − x(kl)〉 ≤ −δs. (30)
At the same time, taking the limit l→∞ in (29), we obtain
〈f ′(x¯), z¯ − x¯〉 ≥ β〈f ′(x¯), z¯ − x¯〉,
i.e., (1− β)〈f ′(x¯), z¯ − x¯〉 ≥ 0, which is a contradiction with (30). ✷
We are ready to prove convergence of the whole method.
Theorem 3 Suppose that assumptions (C1)–(C3) are fulfilled. Then:
(i) The number of changes of index k at each stage s is finite.
(ii) The sequence {w(s)} generated by method (PCGM) has limit points, all these
limit points are solutions of QVI (23).
Proof. Assertion (i) has been obtained in Proposition 6. By construction, the sequence
{w(s)} is bounded, hence it has limit points. By definition, for each s it holds that
〈p(w(s)), y − w(s)〉 ≥ −δs ∀y ∈ D(w
(s)). (31)
Take an arbitrary limit point w¯ of {w(s)}, then
w¯ = lim
t→∞
w(st),
for some subsequence {w(st)}, hence w¯ ∈ D˜. Then D(w¯) is nonempty and w¯ ∈ D(w¯).
Take any y¯ ∈ D(w¯), then there exists a sequence of points {y(st)} ⊂ D(w(st)), {y(st)} →
y¯ since the mapping D is lower semi-continuous on Y˜ . Setting y = y(st) in (31) and
taking the limit t→∞, we obtain
〈p(w¯), y¯ − w¯〉 ≥ 0.
This means that w¯ is a solution of QVI (23). Assertion (ii) is true. ✷
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Following (PCGM), the agents determine their price vector p(k) for the current
market state x(k) in accordance with (C2). However, changing the stage does not
require calculation of the price since the real state remains the same. This means
that the agents only adjust their current tolerances for determination of the sufficient
decrease of the pure expenses of the market; see (28). The main part of the iteration
consists in solution of problem (25) at x(k). This problem clearly decomposes into
n independent single commodity market equilibrium problems of form (4) with fixed
prices. In fact, the j-th commodity market problem is now written as follows:
min
y(j)∈Dj
→
∑
i∈I
p
(k)
ij yij,
where
Dj =
{
y(j) ∈ R
m
∑
i∈I
yij = 0, yij ∈ [α
(k)
ij , β
(k)
ij ], i ∈ I
}
,
α
(k)
ij and β
(k)
ij are the corresponding capacity bounds; cf. (18)–(19). This problem can
be solved by simple arrangement algorithms. Therefore, (PCGM) can be naturally
implemented within usual market mechanisms.
7 Relationships with some other basic equilibrium
models
In this section, we intend to make a comparison of the presented model with the existing
basic general and partial equilibrium models.
We recall that the classical Walrasian type general equilibrium models describe a
market of a great number of economic agents so that actions of any separate agent
can not impact the state of the whole system and traditionally belong to the perfect
competition market models. These models are based on the assumption that any agent
does not utilize particular information about the behavior of the others, but accepts the
common market price values and then determines precisely his/her personal demand
and/or supply values. These values create the general market excess supply values
that have certain impact on the prices. Namely, a negative (positive) market excess
supply of a commodity forces the its price to increase (decrease), thus defining the
so-called taˆtonnement process; see [1, 8]. Hence, the model essentially exploits (in fact,
postulates) the assumption that there exists a common (market) price value for each
commodity at any moment that can be recognized by any separate agent. Then the
budget constraint of any consumer involves just these common prices, which is usually
active for his/her optimal choice due to the basic non-satiability property of the utility
function. Similarly, any producer maximizes his/her profit, which is again determined
by the same common prices. Next, the equilibrium conditions in the classical models
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are determined as complementarity relationships between the prices and market excess
supply values; see e.g. [7, 8].
Our model is based on the assertion that the agents of a general market do not
possess in fact a sufficient information about the current and future behavior of so
complicated system. That is, information for their decision making can be only partial
and local. This means that each agent can evaluate his/her opportunities only in a
neighborhood of the current market state by using his/her technology peculiarities and
capacities, some integral parameters of the market (say, the current total supply or
demand for certain commodities), and some information on other agents due to the
transaction process. For instance, this lack of information about the market partici-
pants is typical for contemporary telecommunication based systems; see, e.g., [26, 27].
Besides, the behavior of each economic agent depends on his/her current market, in-
dustry and social goals and restrictions. For this reason, the assumption that there
exists an “ideal broker” who is able to determine precisely the common market price
for each commodity at any moment and report simultaneously all these prices to all
the agents seems rather restrictive. Similarly, it seems too difficult requirement for an
agent to precisely fulfil the budget constraint with common prices also because of the
data uncertainty. It should be noted that common constraints may appear due to the
complexity of the system, these constraints can reflect common market, transporta-
tion, and/or technology relationships that are actively utilized by different agents. For
instance, markets with joint constraints arise often in telecommunication and energy
sectors; see e.g. [28, 26, 29].
For this reason, we suppose that the agents will utilize their own prices that may
differ from the current market prices even at an equilibrium state. These prices are
values of their feasible price mappings attributed to the current market state that is
determined by the current distribution of commodities. Similarly, the agents determine
feasible transaction sets dependent of the current market state. Instead of the exact
budget constraint any agent should simply indicate current sources that will cover
his/her consumption expenses for each purchased commodity, as described in Section
5. This approach leads to a quasi-variational inequality formulation of the market equi-
librium state, which corresponds to the local maximal market profit in a neighborhood
of the current state. It was proved in Section 4 that the proposed market equilibrium
model also involves common market prices as the Lagrange multipliers corresponding
to the common balance constraint, but they are in general different from the equilib-
rium prices of the agents; see Proposition 2. It also follows that the agents may have
positive endowments at equilibrium due to the market capacity bounds as in the single
commodity case.
We observe that most imperfectly competitive (or partial) equilibrium models and
some general market equilibrium models are formulated as non-cooperative game-
theoretic problems; see e.g. [30, 5]. Due to the common balance constraint in any
market, the agents are mutually dependent, which contradicts to the custom non-
cooperative game setting with equal and independent players. But in the imperfect
16
competition case, actions of each agent can change the state of the whole market so
that agents’ utility functions depend on these actions (strategies). In order to avoid
the mentioned drawback, the imperfect competition models are based on uneven roles
of market sides. Namely, one side of the market (say, consumers) is presented by a
common price function, whereas each agent from the other side (producer) can change
the state of the whole system so that the common balance is always satisfied implic-
itly. Therefore, the model becomes a game of producers and its solution is usually
determined as its Nash equilibrium point. However, this is not the case for the gen-
eral market equilibrium models with equal agents, which are then formulated as ex-
tended non-cooperative game-theoretic problems; see e.g. [5]. The presence of the
joint binding constraints creates certain difficulties for players and needs in a special
non-trivial mechanism for attaining such an equilibrium point; see e.g. [31]. Therefore,
our quasi-variational inequality formulation of the market equilibrium problem seems
rather natural and suitable for different applications.
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